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The number of COVID-19 outbreaks reported in UK care homes rose rapidly
in early March of 2020. Owing to the increased co-morbidities and therefore
worse COVID-19 outcomes for care home residents, it is important that we
understand this increase and its future implications. We demonstrate the use
of an SIS model where each nursing home is an infective unit capable of
either being susceptible to an outbreak (S) or in an active outbreak (I).
We use a generalized additive model to approximate the trend in growth
rate of outbreaks in care homes and find the fit to be improved in a model
where the growth rate is proportional to the number of current care home
outbreaks compared with a model with a constant growth rate. Using
parameters found from the outbreak-dependent growth rate, we predict a
73% prevalence of outbreaks in UK care homes without intervention as a
reasonable worst-case planning assumption.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.1. Introduction
Institutional communities have the potential, upon establishment of a respiratory
disease, to suffer a large proportion of the population within becoming infected
[1]. Early reports of a novel infection circulated in December 2019 and in January
2020 this infection was attributed to a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2. Since
then, the disease has become a pandemic with documented outbreaks in most
countries [2].
Outbreaks have been reported in many settings. The outbreak of COVID-19
on board the cruise ship Diamond Princess first came to attention when Japa-
nese authorities quarantined the vessel in Yokohama on 5 February 2020 [3].
Care homes conceptually share similarities to cruise ships in terms of having
a stable resident population and a staff population (the period of stability of
the population here is similar to or longer than the duration of an outbreak).
However, in a care home context the staff population is much better connected
to a wider community and the frailty of the residential population is greater,
meaning that contact rates are likely higher and eventual outcome worse. Inter-
nationally there have been a number of outbreaks in care homes, with





































































































































Figure 1. (a) Number of care home outbreaks reported each day to Public Health England [7] (red dots), generalized additive model (GAM) best-fit curve (black
line) and CI (dashed lines) (quasi-Poisson link with spline on time and fixed effect on weekend or weekday). (b) Instantaneous growth rate in number of reported
care homes in England derived from spline generated by GAM (solid black line), and 95% confidence interval on growth rate (dashed lines); horizontal blue line





influenza in institutional (enclosed) communities has shown
that, while the particular kind of society (prison, care
home, school, barracks, etc.) was not a significant explanatory
variable of attack ratio, a person’s occupation within the
society was [5].
In this analysis, we define a care home in England as pre-
mises that the Care Quality Commission (CQC, [6]) monitors,
inspects and regulates and in which clients live permanently
(or in some situations temporarily owing to, say, a hospital
discharge package). Residential settings include care homes
for older people, people with learning disabilities, looked-
after children, people with mental health problems or sub-
stance misuse problems, and hospices. A care home may or
may not then have nursing care and so the vulnerability of
the residents within will vary from home to home, so it is
difficult to generalize a representative care home.
Care homes are at risk of disease importation through
connections with community (via staff and visitors) and hos-
pital settings (the frailty of resident population means trips to
hospital increased and further discharges to care homes were
arranged to ensure capacity on hospital wards). In this study,
we consider data from Public Health England (PHE) on care
homes reporting outbreaks, applying statistical techniques to
the data to forecast eventual potential burden.2. Methods
(a) Data
The data, reported to PHE by its network of Health Protection
Teams, showed the number of care homes (i.e. homes registered
with CQC providing residential or nursing care) newly reporting
an outbreak of at least one case each day in England, for a16 week period from 8 March 2020 to 27 June 2020, and is visu-
alized in figure 1. An updated version is published online
weekly by PHE [7].
Further data were available with the postcodes of the affected
care homes so we can match this to the CQC register of care
homes to consider the risk of outbreaks over space. Where mul-
tiple care homes are registered in a single postcode these homes
were aggregated to find, say, the reported number of care home
beds in that postcode area.
Some care homes report the outbreak status within the home
at the time of report (number of cases etc.) but there is no mechan-
ism for reliably updating this information at present so a
dynamical model within care homes is of limited benefit based
on these data.
(b) Statistical analysis
A generalized additive model (GAM) was used to look at
trends over time (in R using mgcv with negative binomial
family) [8] in England. Dips in reporting at weekends can be
seen and a day of week term was included as an additional
fixed effect explanatory variable alongside day of report, which
is fitted with a P-spline (chosen over other smoother options to
control for wiggliness).
As a separate analysis, the PHE outbreak data may be linked
to the CQC register [6] at postcode spatial scale to create a dataset
of presence (those homes with an outbreak) and absence (those
without an outbreak) to a specific time point. A Gaussian process
smoother is used for the spatial term (using Easting and North-
ing of the postcode centroid converted to kilometre scale), with a
thin-plate spline for care home size, and an indicator for urban
rural split as additional explanatory variable. This spatial analy-
sis is modelled with a binomial family GAM (implemented in
mgcv as above).
The Gaussian process smoother was tested with both a power
exponential with exponent equal to one and a Matérn correlation
Table 1. The (non-spline) model coefficients and associated standard errors
(in brackets) for each day of the week in the temporal model.
day of week 16 weeks 8 weeks
Monday 3.75 (0.067) 4.21 (0.079)
Tuesday 3.79 (0.066) 4.25 (0.078)
Wednesday 3.76 (0.066) 4.24 (0.077)
Thursday 3.86 (0.065) 4.35 (0.075)
Friday 3.71 (0.066) 4.21 (0.076)
Saturday 3.02 (0.076) 3.53 (0.085)




3function with κ = 1.5 and a value of ρ chosen that provided the
lowest restricted maximum-likelihood score (REML) [8].
(c) Mathematical modelling
Care homes are in two states, either showing no cases of disease
or with some cases detected. Given the number of care homes N
is fixed we can consider just the number of care homes reporting
at least one case, rather than the proportion.
The number of care homes with at least one case, I, will
increase by further cases being detected in previously unaffected
care homes. It will decrease when laboratory confirmation
arrives that the infected cases are not COVID-19 (fast timescale
of a couple of days) or when the care home outbreak is declared
over. Once declared infection-free a care home may be reinfected
later in the pandemic.
Assuming an average duration T can be constructed between
the fast-acting timescale of laboratory confirmation and slower
timescale of outbreak cessation, then I→ I− 1 at some rate γI,
where γ = 1/T.
The increase in I is harder to model accurately. We assume
there is a between-care-home force of infection at rate L so that
I→ I + 1 with rate L(N  I), where N is the number of care
homes in total.
A key question is what is an appropriate form of L. It is well
established that an SIS (susceptible–infected–susceptible) model
will attain a steady state [9] with constant parameters, but we
consider a variety of possible forms of L.
If the natural transmission rate is unaffected by future inter-
ventions (and so the time variation in force of infection ‘locks’
onto a steady state), then we can project from the plateau to
estimate a reasonable worst-case attack rate. The eventual preva-
lence of care homes suffering an outbreak if this trend continued
which would be P∞ = TQ∞/N, where T is the recovery time, Q∞
is the number of the care homes in England that report each day
at steady state incidence and N is the total number of care homes
in England. According to the CQC, the number of care homes is
N = 15 517 as of April 2020 [6].
Alternatively, ‘recovered’ care homes can be removed from
the data (unless homes have experienced major outbreaks they
will remain susceptible to reintroduction of disease) and so we
may consider the first reported outbreak in each care home. In
this case γ→ 0 and we define the infection rate to be
L(t) ¼ b(t)I=N  O(1). The consequence of this is that
I(t) ¼ N
1þ exp (B(t)) ,
where B(t) ¼ Ð t0 b(t) dt. This is the form of the canonical link func-
tion of a binomial family within a generalized linear modelling
framework. Indeed, in the case of the additive model above,
the function B is represented by a constant term and a spline
m0 þ s(t) ¼
Ð t
0 b(t) dt and so the infection rate b(t) ¼ _s(t). Note
that if β(t) = β, a constant, then we recover the form expected
when the force of infection is proportional to the number of
infected care homes.
This latter formulation would provide a very simple framework
for estimating β(t), but the time series is not independent of pre-
vious observations (the number of infections on a given day is
related to number of infections in the past). While the central esti-
mate may be representative of the trend, the uncertainty will not
be well characterized, which will require further investigation.3. Results
Figure 1 shows the number of new reported outbreaks
of COVID-19 in care homes in England, which rose rapidly
in early to mid-March. The early rapid growth in newreported outbreaks is consistent with rapid growth obser-
ved in other surveillance schemes, which was a major
cause of concern [10]. In late March, the number reported
plateaued for three weeks before dropping in late April to
level off in June at relatively small numbers of outbreaks
being reported.
There is a clear weekend lull in reporting outbreaks.
Table 1 shows the scaling factors for each day of the week
using sixteen weeks and eight weeks of data. Saturday and
Sunday have the lowest numbers of outbreaks reported,
with around 50% fewer than on a Monday; other days have
similar reporting rates to Monday. There is little relative
difference between week day effects based on eight weeks
and sixteen weeks of data.
Figures 1b and 2b show the derivative of the spline arising
from the GAM. If this derivative is constant and positive then
this is a sign of exponential growth, if constant and negative,
of exponential decay, and if it is tracking the horizontal blue
line (a reference line for zero growth) this is suggestive that
the data is plateauing. There is some evidence from the
upper 95% confidence interval touching zero of overall down-
ward trend in late April as well as the more recent evidence
of plateau in June.
Figure 2 shows the data for an eight week period up to the
start of May. Considering this censored time series it can be
seen that the data during April seemed to be in a state of pla-
teau. The SIS theory predicts a steady state of a constant
fraction of new care homes reporting an outbreak and so
the observed trend can be projected into the future. These
local hot-spots of outbreaks are suggestive of local patterns
of transmission and connectedness of local care homes
rather than a random series of outbreaks.
We find an upper limit estimate on Q∞= 190/N from the
two week plateau seen in the data and fit by the GAM,
which we use as a worst-case scenario. The recovery time of a
care home is uncertain. If the generation time is taken to be
5 days [11] and 3–4 generations of disease occur with associated
wait of 14 days after last observed case, then T≈ 34 is plausible,
meaning that P∞ = 0.41. If T= 60 days (allowing for weaker
infection control and undiagnosed cases) then P∞ = 0.73 is
potential reasonable worst-case planning end state.
Figure 3 shows the results with the Gaussian process
smoother used over space. The Matérn function shown has
the smallest REML, with ρ = 58. This approach identifies the
increase risk of outbreaks occurring in the North West of
England focused on Liverpool, as well as other hot-spots



















































































Figure 2. (a) Number of care home outbreaks reported each day to Public Health England [7] (red dots), generalized additive model (GAM) best-fit curve (solid
black line) and CI (dashed lines) (quasi-Poisson link with spline on time and fixed effect on weekend or weekday). (b) Instantaneous growth rate in number of
reported care homes in England derived from spline generated by GAM (solid black line), and 95% confidence interval on growth rate (dashed lines); horizontal blue


















Figure 3. Proportion of care homes reporting an outbreak to PHE up to 1
May 2020 (comparable to the data in figure 2). Spatial smoothing is per-
formed with a binomial family generalized additive model with Gaussian
process smoothing on Easting and Northing (of postcode centroid) and
thin-plate spline on care home size (based on CQC registration), with fixed





















Figure 4. Estimated thin-plate spline obtained from the spatial GAM based






Figure 4 shows the fitted spline for the number of beds
shown in the CQC register. This suggests a fairly linear
increase in risk for care homes of declared size below 30
beds before the risk levels off (though becoming more uncer-
tain) as number of beds within a home increases. The model
intercept has a value of 0.174 (s.e. 0.072), while postcode withcare homes that are classed as Urban have an odds ratio of
1.166 (0.999, 1.36).4. Discussion
This analysis is relatively simple and does not address the size of




5based on local outbreak management and reporting. Bringing
the space and time models together in a single framework is
ongoing work. However, it is important to observe that
the 73% value is the prevalence of care homes with outbreaks
and not the incidence within. This means homes should expect
to suffer multiple importations over time until local herd
immunity is reached, provided there is no change in behaviour
or bio-security policy affecting ingress. These outbreaks will
accumulate cases so the cumulative attack rate within a home
maybe large owing to amix of explosive outbreaks and repeated
importation.
The early growth in the data that reduces the ability of fit-
ting a constant force of infection may be an artefact of
surveillance (a relatively new scheme having improved
uptake in usage over time) rather than disease-driven.
Additionally, the importation of infection may be higher in
early stages (i.e. prior to ‘lockdown’) from the community
(i.e. visitors) or from cases being discharged from hospital.
In England, some interventions were implemented on
24 March 2020, when enhanced testing of hospital transfers
and cessation of visitors may have started to reduce opportu-
nities for disease ingress to care home settings, but
recommendation of these mitigation strategies evolved over
time; for example, it was not until 14 June that care homes
were advised to quarantine all new residents on admission.
Changes in policy do not universally lead to changes in
practices during the pandemic.
A plausible explanation of the model presented here is that
the vehicle connecting care homes is the staff. Staff seem to be
suffering disease at similar numbers to residents where it is
reported to PHE (it should be noted that the reason for staff
absence is unclear in the data and it may be that staff are
absent for precautionary reasons or care of dependents else-
where, rather than owing to the disease directly). If staff
work in multiple care homes then these high attack rates may
lead to depletion of susceptible staff and so reduce transmission
rates over time. However, recent statements fromWHO suggest
evidence for long-lasting immunity is limited [12]. Moreover,
staff interact with their households and the community and
other care homes, so infection can be passed between care
homes with staff acting as the main vectors. This is not a sign
that staff are being unobservant of the current severity of the
situation but highlights the challenges they face and the high
numbers of cases with mild symptoms.
More recent data up to 23 July 2020 have shown a
reduction in outbreaks being reported [7]. This trend is a
positive sign and may be a sign of changing policy in some
areas. This suggests the reasonable worst-case scenario of
73% of care homes being in outbreak status at any given
time is not going to be observed, but it should be noted
that this modelling was originally conducted in mid-April
at the peak of outbreaks being reported and changes in prac-
tice rapidly introduced as a result of the original assessment
may have had a role in the reduction. Further work will be
conducted to bring together the spatio-temporal statistical
modelling with more detailed epidemic modelling.
Further investigation is imperative for understanding the
outbreaks within care homes, explicitly including the role of
staff. This can be established through enhanced testing and
monitoring the interactions of care homes with the wider
community. It also suggests the need for support intervention
to assist outbreak management and hard-pressed staff work-
ing in the social care sector.In context
The Covid-19 pandemic placed significant pressure not only
on UK’s hospitals, but also on the resources and capacity of
the non-hospital healthcare system. This pressure was par-
ticularly acute in social care settings, which have a triple
risk of (1) a closed population that are (2) highly vulnerable
to infection and (3) transmission is boosted due to close
and frequent contact. Indeed, both residential and nursing
care homes experienced significant outbreaks of Covid-19
and high mortality rates. In England, there are approximately
15 000 care homes with 450 000 beds.
On 9 March 2020, UoM researchers submitted a paper to
SPI-M that quantified the likely impact of unconstrained
Covid-19 spread in care homes, in terms of hospitalisations
and deaths (results from which were later presented in
Overton et al. [13]).
This SPI-M report led directly to conversations with
colleagues in Department of Health and Social Care
(and HMPPS) about reasonable worst case scenarios for
closed societies (during w/c 30th March) which provided
access to reported outbreaks in care home settings from
9th April onwards. On the 19thApril initial analysis was-
shared with SPI-M based on projections using a
Generalised Additive Model and ‘SIS’ model approach that
forms the basis of this special issue. This report forecast
90% of care homes would be in a state of outbreak at the
same time if the existing trend continued. On the 11th May
the medRxiv submission was made with a slightly lower
estimate of attack rate in care homes based on longer
time-series of data.
The week after the first SPIM report (24th April) the first
care home analysis group meeting was held, and a week later
the group formally became the SAGE working group on care
homes. This group then submitted a paper to SAGE on 12
May 2020 [14] which contained further modelling analysis
(from range of modelling groups) looking at testing strategies
and evidence that made the case for collecting better-quality
data and testing of both residents and staff within care
homes. The number of outbreaks has subsequently changed
over time due to combination of national lockdown’s redu-
cing force of infection into care homes, the role of testing
staff and residents and specific infection control within care
home settings which is currently subject to ongoing
evaluation and review.Data accessibility. A publicly available version of the data is cited; full
release of data is not possible owing to the the disclosure status of
data.
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